Figure 1. Unique equilibrium.
Figure 2. Changes in the relative precision, \(\alpha\).
Figure 3. Changes in the costs of manipulation, \(c\).
Figure 4. A small increase in \(c\) can lead to a large reduction in manipulation \(\delta^*\).
Figure 5. Citizens’ utility \(u^*(\alpha,c)\) as a function of \(\alpha\).
Figure 6. Citizens’ indifference curves \(u^*(\alpha,c)\).
Figure 7. Politician’s payoff \(v^*(\alpha,c)\).
Figure 8. Politician benefits most when \(c\) is low and \(\alpha_x\) is high.
Figure 9. Citizens and journalists lose most when \(c\) is low and \(\alpha_x\) is high.
Discontinuity at \(c=1\) and jump in the amount of manipulation \(\delta^*\)