Citizens’ equilibrium response \(k^*\) (left panel) and politician’s equilibrium manipulation \(\delta^*\) (right panel) as functions of the politician’s costs of manipulation \(c\) for various levels of the relative precision \(\alpha\). The politician’s \(\delta^*\) is decreasing in \(c\) and asymptotes to zero as \(c\rightarrow \infty\). If \(\alpha<1\), the precision effect dominates so that as \(\delta^*\) decreases the citizens’ \(k^*\) increases and asymptotes to \(k^*_{nm}\) from below as \(c\rightarrow\infty\). If \(\alpha>1\) then for high enough \(c\) we have \(\delta^*<\hat{\delta}(\alpha)\) so that the correlation effect begins to dominate at which point \(k^*\) starts to decrease and asymptotes to \(k^*_{nm}\) from above as \(c\rightarrow \infty\).