Politician’s benefit from manipulation \(v^*-v_{nm}^*\) (top row) and payoff \(v^*\) (bottom row) as functions of the intrinsic precision \(\alpha_x\) for various costs of manipulation \(c\) when the journalists’ actions are strong strategic substitutes \(\lambda<-1/2\) (left column) or strong strategic complements \(\lambda>1/2\) (right column). The politician’s payoff absent manipulation \(v_{nm}^*\) asymptotes to zero as \(\alpha_x\rightarrow\infty\). If \(c>1\) the politician’s payoff with manipulation \(v^*\) also asymptotes to zero but if \(c<1\) then \(v^*\) asymptotes to \((1-c)/\alpha_z>0\) so that the politician benefits. The politician benefits the most when when \(c\) is low and \(\alpha_x\) is high. In the left column we use \(\lambda<-1\) to highlight that for this parameter setting \(v^*\) and \(v_{nm}^*\) need not be monotonic in \(\alpha_x\).